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Article 3

OVERQUALIFIED, UNQUALIFIED OR JUST RIGHT:
THINKING ABOUT AGE DISCRIMINATION AND
TAGGART v. TIME*
Julia Lamber**
INTRODUCTION

While the nation remains committed to equal opportunity,
there is no strong consensus about what equality means. We
agree that excluding African-Americans from law school because
of their race is impermissible, that requiring only women to take
unpaid leaves of absence from their jobs is wrong, and that expecting native Spanish speakers to converse only in English is
naive. There is little agreement, however, on the advisability of
public high schools for African-American boys only,1 the wisdom
of child care leave just for mothers,2 or whether racism explains
the lack of commercial endorsements for a United States
Olympic champion of Japanese descent.3 Our ambivalent feelings about these and other issues surrounding equality are reflected in many decisions involving anti-discrimination law. Taggart v. Time,4 a recent age discrimination case from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, raises the question of discrimination in the employment context, especially how
to distinguish employer justifications for certain employment decisions from the claim of age discrimination itself.
Fifty-eight-year-old Thomas Taggart applied for many positions in various Time Inc. ("Time") divisions but never received
* 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991).
** Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. I wish to thank Patrick
Baude, Terry Bethel, Mike Cavosie and Jean Robinson for their comments on various
versions of this paper.
I See Garrett v. Bd. of Educ. of School Dist. of City of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004
(E.D. Mich. 1991).
2 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER (1989); Lucinda M. Finley, Tran-

scending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate,86
COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986).
3 See Stuart Elliott, Company News: Breaking the Ice; from Olympic Gold to Advertising, at Last, N.Y. TMS, May 15, 1992, at D3.
4 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991).
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an offer of employment. Time explained this result by saying
that Taggart was overqualified for some positions and underqualified for others, that his previous supervisor was not totally
positive in his evaluation of Taggart, and that he performed
poorly at some interviews. After pursuing administrative remedies, Taggart sued Time in federal district court in New York,
alleging that Time's failure to hire him was a violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). The
district court granted Time's motion for summary judgment,
noting that Taggart was unqualified for most of the jobs in question and that his stated overqualification for another position
was a reasonable business judgment to which the court must defer.' The Second Circuit reversed, suggesting that "'overqualified' .... may often be simply a code word for too old."
Taggart v. Time is worthy of comment in this review of Second Circuit decisions for several reasons. First, while the issue of
qualifications is often raised in employment discrimination
cases, Taggart is the first court of appeals decision to grapple
with the potentially discriminatory nature of excluding applicants because they are "overqualified" in the age discrimination
context.8 Second, the facts of Taggart expose the inadequacies
of the well-known analytical framework for individual disparate
treatment cases found in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.,
Third, Taggart provides an opportunity to examine a small part
of the larger question about the meaning of equality. How do we
think about "overqualified" as an attribute and what does it
mean in terms of discrimination? Does the conclusion raise an
inference of impermissible age discrimination and if so, why?
Does it suggest a sensible employer making a reasonable business decision and if so, what happens to the age claim? Taggart
seems most obviously about claims of intentional discrimination,
the core of nondiscrimination laws. The hard question always
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1992).
Taggart, 1990 WL 16956, at *4, *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1990).
' 924 F.2d at 44.
8 The court of appeals' opinion cites two district court opinions, EEOC v. District of
Columbia, Dep't of Human Services, 729 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1990), vacated, 925 F.2d
488 (D.C. Cir. 1991), and Vaughn v. Mobil Oil Corp., 708 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
8

The facts are closest to Taggart in the District of Columbia case; the case is different
though because, contrary to Taggart, the employer did not concede that overqualifica.
tion was the reason for rejecting the applicant.
9 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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has been proof; the interesting question has been what inferences are we willing to make.
This Article reviews the two decisions in Taggart. Next it
suggests alternative readings of the opinions, considers briefly
two similar, more recent, Second Circuit decisions, and finally
examines the implications of Taggart's holding for future age
discrimination cases.
I.

THE TAGGART DECISIONS

A. Facts
In May 1983 Time notified Thomas Taggart and other employees that it intended to dissolve its subsidiary, Preview Subscription Television Inc. ("Preview"). Time also informed the
Preview employees of its policy to "make special efforts to assist
in finding other Time Inc. jobs" and that a "staff member is entitled to an interview with any department head who has an
opening."1 0 Taggart, who had been a print production manager
at Preview, applied for more than thirty jobs. Time's employment counselors contacted fourteen managers on his behalf. Although Taggart had eight interviews, he ultimately received no
job offers.
For the position of editorial production assistant, the interviewer ranked Taggart sixth out of seven. She noted that "I
question whether the pressure would affect him. The schedules
were no problem with him but [he] mentioned he really didn't
have much of a choice. Interpreted by me as unenthusiastic
about the job." 1 For another position a different interviewer
concluded that Taggart "gave the impression that he did not
have the stability to deal well under pressure."' 2 For still other
positions the district court specified that interviewers concluded
that Taggart did not have the "very precise experience" needed
and his follow-up letters revealed that he lacked the "attention
to detail required in the print production field."'13 Finally, for a
print purchaser position at Home Box Office ("HBO"), the interviewer did not consider Taggart to be a good candidate be-

101990 WL 16956, at *1.
1 Id. at *4.

Id. at *5.
13Id.
12
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4

The district

court emphasized that "the employment counselor warned Taggart before the interview
that the position was 'a junior position'
15
and not appropriate.'

Taggart alleged that the real reason he was denied employment was his age. He noted that Time hired at least three
younger Preview employees in positions for which he applied.
He also argued that he was qualified, if not overqualified, for
these positions; he maintained that he was "indistinguishable
from the chosen candidates except for superior qualifications
and a substantial age difference."' 6 Finally, he asserted that the

interviews were superficial, simply a courtesy mandated by company policy, and that he was never considered on his qualifications and experience.
B. The District Court Taggart Decision
The district court rejected Taggart's claim with ease and
hostility. 17 The court analyzed the facts under the analytical
framework applicable to claims of individual disparate treatment first enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas v. Green,'" a Title VII case.' 9 Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination. In age cases the plaintiff meets this
burden by showing that he or she belongs to the protected age
14

Id. at *4.

15Id. It is fairly clear from the district court's reiteration of facts that Taggart became increasingly frustrated and angry with his inability to get a job at Time. His interview strategy and personal presentation deteriorated so that by the end of the process,
after some 18 months of searching, he probably was no longer a desirable candidate for a
position at Time.
16 Id. at *3.
17 In his brief Taggart complained about age discrimination in four departments.
The district court said "[I] will review both those positions which Taggart chooses to
discuss and those which he neglects to discuss, because only thus can one discern what
Taggart actually did as a job applicant at Time, and thus what the managers at Time
perceived. It is, after all, managements perception, and not Taggart's, that is at issue."
1990 WL 16956, at *4 (citing EEOC v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1187,
1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). But the district court then discussed only the four departments.
16 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1992)). Claims of age discrimination are analyzed in
the same way as Title VII claims. MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
517 (1988); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
16
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group; that the plaintiff applied for and was qualified for the
position sought; that the plaintiff was not hired despite his or
her qualifications; and that the position was ultimately filled by
a younger person.2 0 The plaintiff who meets this burden establishes a mandatory presumption of discrimination, 21 and the
burden then shifts to the defendant "to articulate a 'legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason' for its action. '22 If the defendant
meets this burden, the presumption drops from the case, but the
plaintiff may still prevail by showing that the proffered reasons
were not the defendant's true reasons for its action. The plaintiff
may do so either "directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
'23
unworthy of credence.
The district court concluded that Taggart failed to state a
prima facie case of discrimination because he had failed to show
either that he was "appropriately qualified for many of the positions or that the evidence raises an inference of discrimination." 24 The district court also stated that "the defendant has
satisfied its burden to articulate legitimate, non-age-related reasons for refusing to rehire" Taggart.2 5 "Taggart has not" continued the court, "rebutted those legitimate reasons by 'solid circumstantial evidence' showing them to be mere pretexts. 20
Taggart had contended that summary judgment in favor of
the defendant was inappropriate because claims of intentional
age discrimination almost always raise factual issues. The rules
of civil procedure allow summary judgment only when "there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' ' 27 A court must
resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in

2.

1990 WL 16956, at *2. See also Mack A. Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment

Under the Age Discriminationin Employment Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme,
17 GA. L. Rv. 621, 634-44 (1983) (illustrating different approaches to applying McDonnell Douglas in age discrimination cases).

Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981).
Taggart v. Time Inc., No. 87 Civ. 3408, 1990 WL 16956 at *2 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 20,
1990)(citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
'

22

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
1990 WL 16956, at *9.
25 Id.
28 Id.
'
24

2 FED. R Crv. P. 56(c).
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favor of the nonmoving party. Still, courts grant summary judgments unless the nonmoving party sets "forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. '"2 8 Even when

there are factual disputes, a party is entitled to summary judgment if he or she shows that the nonmoving party, when also
bearing the burden of proof at trial, does not have sufficient evidence to support an essential element of the latter's claim. 29 In

Taggart the question was whether a reasonable jury30 could infer
intentional discrimination from the facts as Taggart and Time
presented them. The court's grant of summary judgment turned
on its finding that, because Time's decision was a reasonable
business judgment, a reasonable jury could not find or infer intentional discrimination. 1
The court agreed with Time that, for some jobs, Taggart
was unqualified. With respect to those jobs for which Taggart
was found overqualified, for example the print purchaser position with HBO, the court said it was "reasonable for an employer to reject an applicant whose qualifications are excessive,
such that the job would fail to challenge him and would most
likely encourage him to continue to seek other employment. 3 2
The court bolstered its conclusion that Time had not discriminated against Taggart on the basis of age with two additional
observations: the court noted that Time had originally hired
Taggart at the age of fifty-eight33 and that Taggart acknowl56(e).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); see also Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Lower courts took these 1986 cases as a trilogy to suggest
that they should grant more summary judgments than before. For commentary on this
view, see Daniel P. Collins, Summary Judgment and CircumstantialEvidence, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 491 (1988); Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been
a Material Change in Standards, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770 (1988); D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme
Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35 (1988).
10 A major difference between discrimination claims under the ADEA and Title VII
is that parties have always been entitled to a jury under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2)
(1992), but parties have been entitled to a jury under Title VII only since the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102(c), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1992)).
31 For a thorough discussion of the effects of summary judgment rules in ADEA
cases, see Gale Keane Busemeyer, Summary Judgment and the ADEA Claimant:
Problems and Patterns of Proof, 21 CONN. L. REV. 99 (1988).
32 1990 WL 16956, at *8.
33 Id.
28
29

FED. R. Civ. P.
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edged "no one at Time ever mentioned his age.
C.

'

The Second Circuit Taggart Decision

The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's findings as to
the three positions where Taggart was unqualified and accepted
the lower court's analytical frameworks for individual disparate
treatment cases and summary judgment motions in discrimination cases. But the court of appeals disagreed with the trial
court regarding the print purchaser position at HBO, where
Time had stated that Taggart was not hired because he was
"overqualified." 35 First, the court of appeals rejected Time's argument that "overqualified" can mean "unqualified." 3 Noting
that overqualified is defined as having more education, training,
or experience than a job calls for, the court of appeals said that
it was a fallacy to conclude an overqualified person is an unqualified one.
The court of appeals also explained that in an age discrimination case, overqualified may be simply "a euphemism to mask
the real reason for refusal [to hire], namely, [that] in the eyes of
the employer the applicant is too old.1138 "How," asked the court,
"can a person overqualified by experience and training be
turned down for a position given to a younger person deemed
better qualified?" 39 The Second Circuit rejected the trial court's
conclusion that it was reasonable to exclude an applicant whose
qualifications are excessive because the job would not challenge
him and therefore he might continue to seek other employment.
While acknowledging that this logic might be reasonable when
applied to younger employees, the Second Circuit concluded
that the trial court's rationale did "not comfortably fit those in
the age group the statute protect[ed]. '"4 The court observed
that an older employee is "quite unlikely to continue to seek
other mostly non-existent employment opportunities." 41
The Second Circuit concluded that "refusing to hire Tag-

Id. at *3.

924 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1991).
"Id.
"Id.

"Id.
'9

40
41

Id.

Id. at 47-48.
Id. at 48.
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gart for the sole reason that he was overqualified refutes Time's
42
assertion that it was not discriminating on the basis of age."
Because Taggart met the four prongs necessary for establishing
43
a prima facie case of age discrimination for the HBO position,
a reasonable juror could infer discriminatory motive on the part
of Time based on "a finding that the reason proffered was
44
pretextual and unworthy of credence."

III.

ANALYSIS

The main problem with both the district and circuit court
opinions in Taggart v. Time is that the analytical basis of their
respective holdings is unclear. While it is obvious that the district court thought the employer had not discriminated on the
basis of age, and it is equally clear that the court of appeals was
suspicious that it had, the opinions are confusing with respect to
the relevance of Taggart's overqualification, Time's justifications
and the McDonnell Douglas' pretext stage of analysis. Is "overqualified" always a proxy for age? Is rejecting an overqualified
candidate inherently reasonable? Is something else going on?
The courts' conclusory and incomplete analyses are part of the
problem in understanding the implications of Taggart. But another part of the problem is the analytical framework itself.
A.

Pretext Analysis

Taggart's claim was that it was inappropriate for Time to
exclude him from consideration for various positions because he
was a highly qualified individual. He apparently saw his claim as
one of pretext. 45 According to his view, it was unreasonable to
reject an applicant whose qualifications were at least sufficient,
even if they were excessive. So, "by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence,' 4 Taggart had
shown indirectly that "the proffered reason was not the true rea47
son for the employment decision.

The district court rejected this pretext argument because
42 Id.
4& Id.
44 Id.

1990 WL 16956, at *4.
41 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
"

47 Id.
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Taggart had not "rebutted those legitimate reasons by 'solid circumstantial evidence' showing them to be mere pretexts."' 8 But
once the district court had accepted the reasons as "legitimate,"
it was unclear what kind of "solid circumstantial" evidence Taggart could offer. The district court disagreed with Taggart's
characterization that Time's behavior was unreasonable. Instead, the court accepted Time's rationale that the job would fail
to challenge him and that he would thus continue to seek other
employment. In contrast, the Second Circuit accepted Taggart's
characterization: it is unlikely that an older employee will continue to seek jobs, in part because there are not many job opportunities for an older employee. Therefore, a reasonable employer
would not ignore applicants thought to be overqualified. Thus,
Time's stated reason was unworthy of belief and must be
pretextual.4 9
The court of appeals' analysis was not based on pretext
alone. After noting that it was unlikely for an older employee to
continue to seek work, the court stated that "refusing to hire
Taggart for the sole reason that he was overqualified refutes
Time's assertion that it was not discriminating on the basis of
age."5 0 In effect, the court was saying that Time's argument refuted its own argument that "overqualified" is not age
discrimination.
The Second Circuit continued:
Taggart met the four prongs for presenting a prima facie case of age
discrimination for the HBO position. This [prima facie case] constitutes circumstances from which a reasonable juror could infer discriminatory animus on the part of Time based upon a finding that the
reason proffered was pretextual and unworthy of credence.51
This reasoning makes it sound as if Taggart's prima facie case
was also his case for pretext. The court probably meant that
there was sufficient evidence for a jury, considering the evidence
together, to find a violation of the ADEA 2
If the issue in Taggart is pretext, however inelegantly
phrased, the outcome is a toss-up. The question is whom does

48
49

1990 WL 16956, at *9.
924 F.2d 43, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1991).

50 Id. at 48.

1 Id.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1992).

52
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the jury believe. What inferences does the fact finder draw from
the evidence? At a minimum, this is a question.for the jury in
age discrimination cases.
B.

Qualificationsand the McDonnell Douglas Analysis

Another way to think about Taggart's claim is to tackle the
issue of qualifications for various jobs at Time. Both courts concluded that Taggart was not qualified for most of the jobs."
They disagreed, however, about the HBO position. Time admitted "that its sole reason for refusing to hire Taggart for this position was because he was overqualified" but argued that being
overqualified meant that Taggart was unqualified. 54 Again, the
district court agreed with Time's characterization, concluding
that Taggart "failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination
because he has failed to show ...

[that] he was appropriately

qualified for many of the positions." 55 The district court then
held that Time "satisfied its burden to articulate legitimate,
non-age-related reasons for refusing to rehire" Taggart,50 suggesting that even if Taggart had met his prima facie burden,
Time had adequately rebutted it. Not surprisingly, the court of
appeals rejected the notion that overqualified means unqualified
'5
as a "non sequitur.

7

The problem with sorting out whether the district court or
the Second Circuit has the better view in this linguistic argument is that the analysis is premised on the McDonnell Douglas
analytical framework. Both courts accepted the utility of McDonnell Douglas in deciding claims like that of Taggart." In
fact, Taggart v. Time is an excellent illustration of the limitations of McDonnell Douglas. In McDonnell Douglas Percy
Green, a black mechanic, was laid off from McDonnell Douglas
Corporation. Protesting his discharge and the general hiring
practices of the company, Green participated in several unlawful
demonstrations against McDonnell Douglas. Several weeks later,
when McDonnell Douglas advertised for mechanics, Green ap-

53 1990 WL 16956, at *8; 924 F.2d at 46.
924 F.2d at 47.
1990 WL 16956, at *9.
"Id.
924 F.2d at 47.
68 1990 WL 16956, at *2; 924 F.2d at 46.
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plied but was rejected. Green claimed that the corporation refused to hire him because of his race and his persistent involvement in the civil rights movement. The company denied
discrimination of any kind, asserting that its failure to hire
Green was based upon and justified by his participation in the
unlawful conduct against it.6 9 In the Supreme Court's first encounter with this kind of case, the Court set out the now wellknown analytical framework for individual disparate treatment
cases.
To establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas,
the plaintiff must show that "he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants."6 0 The Court
later described the rationale for these elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test:
[McDonnell Douglas] does demand that the alleged discriminatee
demonstrate at least that his rejection did not result from the two
most common legitimate reasons on which an employer might rely to
reject a job applicant. an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or
the absence of a vacancy in the job sought. Elimination of these reasons for the refusal to hire is sufficient, absent other explanation, to
create an inference that the decision was a discriminatory one.01

Much attention was once addressed to the question of whether
the inference suggested by McDonnell Douglas was reasonable
or consistent with Title VII.6 2 Whatever the merits of that debate, the specifics of the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework are not helpful when the applicant's qualifications are in
question. McDonnell Douglas asks the wrong questions when
the plaintiff wants to argue that the employer's criteria are too
high, too biased, or too specific. McDonnell Douglas is misleading when the employer wants to support its rejection of an applicant by defending sex or age-specific criteria. Similarly, the four11411 U.S.
6o

at 796.
411 U.S. at 802.

6 Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977).
62 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Proof of DiscriminatoryIntent Under Title VII:
United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CAL. L REv. 1201 (1982);
Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial DiscriminationThrough Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINM L Rnv. 1049 (1978);
Hannah A. Furnish, FormalisticSolutions to Complex Problems: The Supreme Court's
Analysis of Individual DisparateTreatment Cases Under Title VII, 6 himus. REL LJ.
353 (1984); D. Don Welch, Removing DiscriminatoryBarriers:Basing DisparateTreatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L REV.733 (1987).
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step McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, in which the plaintiff
must prove he or she is qualified, should not be followed when
the relevant issue is what to make of the assertion that the applicant is overqualified.
Rejecting the specific framework of McDonnell Douglas
does not mean Taggart cannot raise a claim of individual disparate treatment. Nor does rejecting McDonnell Douglas mean
that the employer cannot define the qualities it seeks in its employees. In McDonnell Douglas itself the Court cautioned that
its specification of the prima facie case was not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations. 3
Subsequently, in Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine,6 4 involving the failure to promote and later discharge
of a woman in favor of a man she supervised, the Court said that
the allocation of burdens and the creation of a presumption by
the establishment of a prima facie case was "intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of
intentional discrimination." 5 Finally, in United States Postal
Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 6 where a black male challenged the postal service's failure to promote him, the Court
cautioned against reifying the analysis in McDonnell Douglas
and losing sight of the ultimate issue of whether the employer
had intentionally discriminated against the applicant.
In an individual disparate treatment case, the simple purpose of the prima facie case is to raise an inference of unlawful
discrimination by eliminating common nondiscriminatory reasons for the employer's action.6 7 With the plaintiff's burden thus
understood, discrimination law allows Taggart to make a claim
of individual disparate treatment by showing that he applied for
an available position, but was rejected under circumstances that

63411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981).
61 450 U.S. at 255 n.8.
6 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983). See also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986). In
Mesnick v. General Electric Co., 950 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1991), the court ruled that the
burden-shifting analytical framework in ADEA actions becomes inconsequential once the
employee has made a prima facie case and the employer has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification. At that point, according to the court, the trial court's focus
in deciding a summary judgment motion must be on the ultimate issues of pretext and
discriminatory animus rather than on the burden-shifting framework.
'7 See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977); Furnco Constr. Co.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
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give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Although
the district court recounted the "qualified" language in McDonnell Douglas, it hinted at this other possibility when it noted
that Taggart had failed to state a prima facie case because he
had failed to show "that the evidence raises an inference of
discrimination." '
Similarly, the Second Circuit repeated the well-known test
of McDonnell Douglas but also talked more generally about inferences of intentional discrimination. If the issue in Taggart is
inferences, the outcome, like pretext, turns on what inferences
we are willing to make and, more importantly in an age discrimination case, whether the judge is willing to let a jury draw such
inferences.
C. Proxies and Age-Based Assumptions
Yet another way to think about Taggart's claim is that overqualification is a proxy for age and thus impermissible unless
justified. At one point in the Second Circuit's opinion, the panel
seemed to adopt this view by noting that "[d]enying employment to an older job applicant because he or she has too much
experience, training or education is simply to employ a euphemism to mask the real reason for refusal, namely, in the eyes of
the employer the applicant is too old."' 70 In contrast, the district
court is clearly not thinking about this proxy possibility when it
reasons "[e]ven if Taggart can show that he was qualified and
that a younger individual was hired instead of him, a court cannot infer discriminatory intent so long as the employer can show
that its decision was based on an honest evaluation of the candidates' qualifications.

71

An employer evaluation that relies on an impermissible basis is, even if done in good faith, impermissible. For example, an
employer may not refuse to hire women even though it honestly
believes that its customers would not respond well to a female
employee. 2 The question raised by this third view of Taggart's
claim is whether rejecting applicants because they are overquali- 1990 WL 16956, at *9.
el 924 F.2d at 46.
70 Id. at 47.
'

7'

1990 WL 16956, at *8.
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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fled reflects age-based assumptions and is therefore discriminatory. The district court in Taggart concluded that "[i]t is a reasonable business judgment for an employer to decide not to hire
a prospective employee because that person would be bored in
that job, or would leave upon finding a better job, or both. '' 73 To
the extent this judgment is in fact based on age, it is still impermissible, no matter how reasonable, unless justified in terms of a
statutory defense. The district court said that these judgments
may not be "second-guessed so long as their reasons were
nondiscriminatory.

' 74

There is reason to be suspicious about a policy that excludes
"overqualified" people. First, employers define "overqualified"
primarily in terms of age or in terms of age-related characteristics, such as experience or higher pay. Second is the ease with
which an employer may determine an applicant is overqualified
by glancing briefly at the job opening and announcing that it is a
"junior" position and "not appropriate" for the applicant."
What does "not appropriate" mean? 76 The employer says the
job "would not interest or challenge him."' 77 But interest and
challenge are not necessarily ways to measure qualifications.
Moreover, there are many jobs that do not interest or challenge
employees; employers may not expect or care whether employees
are )interested or challenged. Just as employers do not choose
among candidates on the basis of who needs a job, it is doubtful
that employers choose candidates on the basis of whether they
would be challenged on the job. If so, employers would choose
the most marginally qualified person because he or she would be
the most challenged.
The notion that overqualified means unqualified may be
shorthand for saying the "super-qualified" person may not be
able (or, more likely, willing) to do the job. If overqualified is
linked with age, then one should test the "unable" or "unwilling" assumption specifically in terms of the plaintiff. Part of the
tradition of employment discrimination laws is to test such assumptions directly.7 8 Taking age discrimination seriously re731990 WL 16956, at *3.
74Id.
75 Id. at *4.
76 Id.

77Id.
78

See Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a
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quires asking directly why a particular "overqualified" applicant
is unable (or unwilling) to do the job rather than assuming that
we know the answer.79
There might be other reasons for employers' reliance on the
"unable" assumption. Describing jobs as inappropriate without
regard to the applicant's ability to do the work suggests a status
hierarchy of jdbs and a proper stratification of job occupants. 0
The overqualified employee may be able and willing to do the
work but the employer may not want the "overqualified" applicant in such a position. Perhaps the employer is worried that the
"overqualified" applicant will challenge standard operating procedure. Perhaps the applicant will not be a "team" player. Or
perhaps the applicant will have the knowledge to expose
problems management would rather ignore. If employers have
legitimate work-related concerns, they should test them directly
rather than rely on inexact age-based assumptions.
Another reason employers may exclude "overqualified" employees is that other employees may be uncomfortable around
them. Again, this concern is premised on a proper stratification
of people and jobs. When I entered university teaching, I participated in a university sponsored program for new teachers. The
university arranged lunches with groups of eight faculty members from different disciplines who were all new teachers. At my
table were an assortment of twenty-five to thirty-five-year-olds
and one clearly senior man, by which I mean he was over sixty
years old. Everyone assumed he was the university's convener.
When he introduced himself as a new teacher, we were all embarrassed. Again, part of the tradition of employment discrimination laws is to ignore co-worker or customer preferences in deciding whether it is reasonable to exclude applicants on the basis
of race, gender or age."'

Form of Discrimination,21 B.C. L REv. 345 (1980); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
332-33 (1977).
72 For a subsequent Second Circuit age discrimination case that does so, see Bay v.
Times Mirror Magazine, Inc. 936 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1991); see infra notes 101-09 and
accompanying text.
80 See ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF TnE CoP vowao. 263 (1977).
For a discussion of how these perceptions may explain sex segregation of the job, see
Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretationof Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARv. L REV. 1749, 1824-39 (1990).
81 See, e.g., PLAYER, supra note 19, at 289; EEOC Guidelines on DiscriminationBe-
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF TAGGART

The implications of Taggart, like the decisions themselves,
are unclear. In part, the problem lies with the opinions' failure
to tell us how to think about age and overqualification. Subsequent cases in the Second Circuit have not clarified the analytical picture.
A.

Binder v. Long Island Lighting Company

In Binder v. Long Island Lighting Company82 the plaintiff
claimed that he was forced to accept early retirement because of
his age. While the employer, the Long Island Lighting Company
("LILCO"), conceded that his retirement was involuntary, it denied that age was a factor.8 3 Instead, the employer claimed that
Binder was let go because his position was eliminated and attempts "to locate other positions" for him at LILCO were unsuccessful.84 The Vice President for Human Resources said that
he was unable to find "another position within the company
suitable for someone with Binder's qualifications and experience."' 5 Like the employer in Taggart, this employer looked for
jobs for Binder only "within the salary and grade level Mr.
Binder was at and requiring many, if not all, the technical skills
he possessed."8 8 LILCO worried that if Binder were underemployed he would become frustrated and suffer from low morale.81
The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment;8 the court of appeals reversed, relying heavily on its
earlier decision in Taggart v. Time. 9
But like its Taggart decision, the Second Circuit's opinion
in Binder is unclear about its theoretical basis. First, the court
of appeals concluded that the employer's explanation for not

cause of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (a)(1)(iii) (1991) (refusal to hire because of the preferences of coworkers, employers, clients, or customers); Stephen F. Befort, BFOQ Revisited: Johnson Controls Halts the Expansion of the Defense to Intentional Sex
Discrimination,52 OHIO ST. L.J. 5, 14-15 (1991).
82 933 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1991).
83 Id. at 191.
"' Id. at 189.
85 Id. at 190.
8 Id.
87 Id.

1990 WL 137403, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 1990).

89 933 F.2d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir. 1991).
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finding Binder another position in the company because the
plaintiff was "overqualified" was insufficient "as a matter of law
to rebut Binder's prima facie case."0 0 This conclusion suggests
that the decision implicated age-based assumptions and thus
was intentional discrimination based on age. Alternatively, the
court of appeals said:
[A]lithough a trier would be free to conclude that [the employer] was
acting out of a genuine desire to avoid placing Binder in a job in
which he might be frustrated, exhibit low morale and perform poorly,
it would also be free to conclude that this explanation was
pretextual9 1

This language puts the issue as pretext: does the trier of fact
believe that the employer's stated reason is unlikely to be true
so that age is the more likely explanation for the employer's action? Yet framing the issue in this way neglects the problem
that if the employment decision relies on aged-based assumptions, it should not matter that the employer may have had a
genuine desire to avoid some other consequence.
The ambiguity in the court of appeals' opinion continues
with the following passage:
The ADEA does not forbid employers from adopting policies against

"underemploying" persons in certain positions so long as those policies are adopted in good faith and are applied evenhandedly. How-

ever, such policies may also serve as a mask for age discrimination,
and the issues of good faith and evenhanded application cannot be
resolved on a motion for summary judgment on the present record.t
While the danger of "underemploying" may be that it is used
selectively or that it is adopted for impermissible motives, the
more likely challenge, at least in these cases, is that "underemployment" policies or exclusion of applicants because they are
"overqualified" is inevitably tied to age. 3
This analysis is reminiscent of the doctrinal confusion in

90 933 F.2d at 192.
21 Id. at 193.
92 Id.

I' Whatever the confusion here, there is even less guidance from the district court.
Most of the opinion is written in terms of summary judgment rules and a review of the
affidavits to determine whether they contain evidence supporting the plaintiff. There is
no acknowledgment of the kind of evidence the court looked for in the affidavits. Moreover, there is no mention of "overqualified" in the lower court opinion but rather only
that the decision is based on the view that an employer can eliminate any job it choses.
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many fetal protection cases under Title VII that involved employer policies to exclude all fertile women from certain jobs because of exposure to toxic substances. 4 In United Auto Workers
v. Johnson Controls Inc.9 5 the trial court first addressed the
question of what justification standard was applicable rather
than the more preliminary question of what discrimination claim
the plaintiffs had made. The trial court said that "because of the
fetuses' possibility of unknown existence to the mother and the
severe risk of harm that may occur if exposed to lead, the fetal
protection policy is not facially discriminatory." 96 Similarly,
Judge Altimari, in his reluctant concurrence in Binder, emphasized that "overqualified" was not a buzzword for "too old" because the employer may have legitimate reasons for declining to
employ overqualified individuals."' The dissent continued that
the court should presume good faith use of '"overqualified" unless circumstances give rise to an inference of age discrimination. 8 But the plaintiffs, Taggart and Binder, argued that use of
"overqualified" was the very evidence that gave rise to the inference of discrimination.
Another reason it is hard to know what to make of Taggart
is that the issue seems unlikely to arise very often. In Taggart
and Binder the employers agreed that overqualification was the
only reason for their actions." Given these decisions, it is unlikely that employers will continue to ground employment decisions on overqualification or that it will be burdensome to avoid
doing so. 10 0 Employers can ask employees if they want the lower-

4 See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v.
Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1981) (rejecting defendant's argument that Burdine
should apply but using disparate impact analysis to test overt gender exclusion); see also
Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHi. L.
REv. 1219 (1986); Wendy W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The
Reconciliation of Fetal Protectionwith Employment Opportunity Goals with Title VII,
69 GEO. L.J. 641 (1981).
"9 680 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Wisc. 1988), aff'd en banc, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989),
rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
:6680 F. Supp. at 316.
'7 933 F.2d at 194. If "overqualified" is a buzzword for too old, the fact that the
employer may have a legitimate reason is irrelevant unless the "legitimate reason" rises
to the level of a statutory defense.
"Id.
" Taggart, 924 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1991); Binder, 933 F.2d at 192.
"o For a contrary view, see KANTR, supra note 80, at 304; Binder, 933 F.2d at 19495 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
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paying, lower-status job without presuming to know what the
applicants will do. To the extent that applicants are unhappy
and do not perform well in their new jobs, employers can terminate them for job-related reasons rather than for age-based
assumptions.
B.

Bay v. Times Mirror Magazine, Inc.

Early critics of the Taggartdecision called it "shocking" because observers read the case to hold that an employer commits
age discrimination if it refuses to hire, because of overqualification, anyone in the protected group.1 01 Another recent decision
02
of the Second Circuit, Bay v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc.,
suggests that such a concern may be misplaced. Bay claimed
that after Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. ("Times Mirror") purchased Field & Stream it deliberately eliminated the magazine's
most senior, highly compensated employees, including Bay.
Times Mirror restructured the magazines with the inevitable result that the once autonomous publishers of individual
magazines, such as Bay of Field & Stream, "suddenly found
themselves with greatly diminished responsibility, authority,
and staff."1 0 3 Before the acquisition Bay had been responsible
for virtually all of Field & Stream's business affairs; after the
acquisition he had real authority over only advertising.2
Bay was fired from his downgraded position, which was then
filled by a thirty-five-year-old at a much lower salary. 0 5 First,
Bay claimed that the employer's actions were part of a deliberate effort to replace older, higher paid employees with younger,
less costly employees."
Second, Bay argued that he was rejected for the downgraded publisher job because he was "overqualified," thus implicating Taggart.L0 7 Times Mirror replied
201William

L. Kandel, "Overqualified" or "Appropriately Qualified".New ADEA
Risks, 17 EMiLOYEE REL.L.J. 287, 304 (1991); Mitchell H. Rubenstein, Refusal to Hire
Overqualified Applicants May Constitute Age Discrimination,N.Y. LJ, May 17, 1991,
atl1.

102 936 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1991). Bay is also interesting because the panel included
Judge Michael Mukasey, the district court judge (sitting by designation) in Taggart v.
Time, and Judge Ralph Winter, the author of the panel opinion in Binder.
101 Id. at 114.
104 Id.

120Id. at

116.

10 Id.
120Id. at 118.
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that its decisions were based on Bay's resistance to the restructuring program and his stated dissatification with the fact that
he had to report through others. 10 8 The court of appeals affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer. 09 Aptly rejecting the analogy to Taggart, the Second
Circuit concluded that Bay was in fact dissatisfied and not a
successful worker because of that dissatisfaction.'1 0
CONCLUSION

Seemingly, Taggart is a simple case. The decisions attracted
public attention because they involved a standard management
technique that employers have relied on for years. In employment discrimination law Taggart is important because it is the
first court of appeals decision to confront the issue of excluding
applicants because they are "overqualified." The decisions are
also symptomatic of fundamental doctrinal confusion in today's
discrimination cases and an illustration of the inherent limitations in the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework.
Although Taggart confronts the issue of excluding applicants because they are "overqualified," the opinion is ultimately
unsatisfying. The issue of qualifications generally and overqualified candidates specifically are important policy questions even
apart from age. But the Taggart courts do not discuss them.
Most striking is the question of paternalism, seen clearly in
Binder where the employer does not even tell Binder there is no
"suitable" job, let alone talk to him about a lower-paying, lowerstatus job."' Also, there is the sense that when employers say a
person would not be interested or challenged by a job, the employers are really saying that the person would not be sufficiently enthusiastic or grateful. The consequence of decisions
like Taggart is that important policy questions are decided indirectly rather than in a focused way.
Taggart is also important because it illustrates situations
where the claim of discrimination is mixed up with the justifica108 Id. at 116.

o Id. at 118.
Id. Another way to read Bay is as addressing the controversial issue of whether

110

firing high-paid staff is a violation of the ADEA. See Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
827 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1987); Metz v. Transit Mix, 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
1"1 933 F.2d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 1991).
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tion and where an employer's reason for a particular action
should not be translated into an employee qualification. Despite
the parallels between the ADEA and Title VII, age discrimination is different from discrimination on the basis of race and
gender.1 12 Under Title VII consideration of race is never permissible, except under carefully defined affirmative action programs;"' consideration of gender is generally impermissible, but
courts continue to be troubled by differences between men and
women or among women themselves and whether Title VII allows employers to take such differences into account.11 4 But age,
unlike race or gender, is not always irrelevant to employment
decisions in the same way. Age is relevant to experience, health,
wisdom and longevity. Given the chance, everyone will be in the
protected age category, whereas men will never become women
and whites will never become blacks. Yet, Congress enacted the
ADEA because many employers believed there were good business reasons for eliminating or excluding older workers.', Perhaps we need to think anew about discrimination, its evil, and
its remedy. Understanding Taggart is one small step.

112

29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1992).

113 United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
11 See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 Micn. L. REv. 797 (1939);
Martha Minow, Foreword:Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10 (1937).
115 Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 827 F.2d 13, 21 n.8 (7th Cir. 1957). See also
PLAYER, supra note 19, at 658. See generally EEOC, LEGISLATIVE ISTORY OF THE AGE
DISCRMUNATION iN EhmLOYMiENT

AcT (1981).

